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ABSTRACT
When China sent troops into North Korea to fight the UN forces in 1950, the Soviet Union's
secret air cover for Chinese troops became critical support. However, the Soviet Union's
determination to provide support was not easy. China and the Soviet Union's decision on this
issue changed many times, and it was not resolved until the Chinese leader decided to send
troops to North Korea on October 13, 1950. At the same time, the United States was aware of the
secret involvement of the Soviet Union and made corresponding choices.

ii

INTRODUCTION
The fighting of the air forces of the communist countries with the United Nations Air Force
in the Korean War (1950-1953) has always been a focus of military historians. In their official
history, the U.S. military has long ago publicized the high kill ratio victory of North Korean air
combat and the maintenance of air dominance.1 At the same time, the Chinese military likes to
publicize how the young People's Liberation Army Air Force bravely fought against the former
air overlord, the US Air Force, without falling behind.2 In this battle for North-Korean airspace
domination, there is a "secret" that both sides know but do not care to write much about, and that
is the participation of the Soviet Air Force. The Soviet Air Force was no stranger to China. As
early as the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the Soviet Union and the Guomindang
government reached an agreement that sent some Soviet fighter planes to help China resist the
Japanese army.3 In 1949, when the Communist Party of China won a victory in the civil war, the
Soviet Air Force firmed up its presence in China through the mutual assistance agreement
between China and the Soviet Union.4 Soviet military advisors were to train the newly
established People's Liberation Army Air Force and assist China in defending against bombing
1

Jacob Neufeld. F-15 Origins and Development 1964-1972. (Office of Air Force History, 1974.), 3-4.
Xiaoming Zhang. Red Wings over the Yalu : China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea. (United States: Texas A & M
University Press, 2002.) 208
3 Pingping Gao, and Yaru Li. “Sino-Japanese Air Force’s Deadly Fight for Air Control during the Anti-Japanese War,”（抗战时期
中日空军争夺制空权的殊死搏斗） Military Historical Research,（军事历史研究） no. 02 (1996): 117–30.
4 Zhihua Shen. Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War.(毛泽东，斯大林与朝鲜战争) 2nd ed. (Guangzhou: Guangdong
People’s Publishing House, 2003.) 145-149.
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by the Taiwan-based Guomindang Air Force. Nevertheless, sending the Soviet Air Force directly
to North Korea to fight Americans was still a very risky proposition. The confrontation between
the two superpowers might have escalated into a new world war. So when and how did Stalin
make this risky decision, and when did the Soviet Air Force participate in the war?
It seems that American historians have not done much research on this issue. Dr. Zhang
Xiaoming's Red Wings Over Yalu gave a detailed introduction to the Soviet Air Force's assistance
to the People's Liberation Army Air Force, Zhang did not cover political details in the book but
focused on military analysis.5 For example, in Chapter 4, Zhang introduced in detail how the
Soviet Air Force helped the newborn PRC withstand bombing from the Guomindang Air Force
and train the Chinese Air Force, but skipped negotiations and diplomatic games between Beijing,
Pyongyang and Moscow.6 Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War by Sergei
Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai is a Western political and historical work that studies
the game between Mao Zedong and Stalin when he sent troops to aid them in their conflict
during the civil war. The book does not specifically write a separate chapter of the Soviet Air
Force's secret warfare.7 Chinese Cold-War historians, such as Shen Zhihua and other historians
in Center for Cold War International History Studies(CCWIHS), have conducted a more in-depth
study of this topic, but many of their works have not been published in the Western world.
Among them, the History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea（抗美援朝战争史）
Zhang. Red Wings over the Yalu
Ibid. “From Defending China to Intervention Korea”. 78-98
7 Sergej N Goncarov, John W Lewis, and Litai Xue. “China Enters The Korean War” Uncertain Partners. (Stanford, Calif:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1994.)168-202
2
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compiled by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences is seen as the most authoritative work in
China. The book also mentions that the Chinese leaders consulted with the Soviet leaders on the
issue of troops and Soviet air support.8 Several other books published in English by the Chinese
scholars such as , Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s ,
A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 and Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership,
1945–1959: A New History all mention the secret involvement of the Soviet Air Force in the
Korean War.9 Among them, Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History is
provides the most detailed writing on this subject. In Chapter 3, Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng
introduced and analyzed in detail the game between China, the Soviet Union, and the DPRK on
secret warfare and other military assistance.10 Mao, Stalin and the Korean War also conducted a
very detailed record and analysis of Sino-Soviet relations, but the part about the Soviet Air Force
secretly participating in the war is scattered across Chapters VII and VIII.11 Shen Zhihua also
published an article in 2010 on Strategic Studies entitled “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet
Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese--Soviet--Korean Alliance in the Early Stage of the
Korean War”, as the name implies, the main content of this article is about the Soviet Union
sending air forces into the Korean battlefield.12 A special article on the secret participation of the
8

Chinese Academy of Military Sciences Military History Research Department. The History of the War to Resist US Aggression
and Aid Korea（抗美援朝战争史） (Beijing: Military science press, 2000.)166-169
9 Zhihua Shen. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917-1991. China Connections. (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.);
Zhihua, Shen, and Neil Silver. Mao, Stalin and the Korean War. Cold War History Series. (London: Routledge Ltd, 2012.)
10 Zhihua Shen, and Yafeng Xia. “Differences and Cooperation during the Korean War”in Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership,
1945–1959. Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series. (US: Lexington Books, 2015.)69-99.
11 Shen,and Silver. “North Korea crosses the 38th Parallel” and “China desides:’whatever the sacrifice necessary’” in Mao, Stalin
and the Korean War. 133-177.
12 Zhihua Shen. “China and the Dispatch of the Soviet Air Force: The Formation of the Chinese-Soviet-Korean Alliance in the
Early Stage of the Korean War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 33, 33, no. 2 (April 1, 2010): 211–30.
3

Soviet Air Force in its original Chinese version not included in the English version.13 However,
there seem to be no other English works specifically referring to the political exchanges between
China, the Soviet Union, U.S., and the DPRK during this period. Some of these books about the
Soviet Union ’s secret participation the Korean War somewhat overlap with the narrative of this
essay, but this thesis focuses only on Soviet aviation assistance and makes some new arguments.

Shen. “Soviet Air Force in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea” in Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War. （毛
泽东，斯大林与朝鲜战争）329-341.
4
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SOVIET AIR FORCE AID TO CHINA AND NORTH KOREA
BEFORE THE WAR
After its victory was accomplished in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party approached Soviet
authorities to help speed up its progress in establishing an air force. On July 25, 1949, during a
secret visit of several members of the CPC Central Committee to the Soviet Union, a letter by
Mao Zedong to Stalin was hand-delivered by Chinese Politburo member Liu Shaoqi.14 Mao
hoped that Chinese pilots could go to the Soviet Union for training and that the Soviet Union
would assist with 100 to 200 fighter planes and dozens of bombers to aid the anticipated invasion
of Taiwan by the CCP. On September 19, 1949, the Soviet Council of Ministers issued a
resolution to provide military assistance to China, including the personnel and aircraft required
by the six aviation schools that the PRC was setting up.15 Soviet personnel to be dispatched
included 42 commanders, 96 instructors, 84 pilots-instructors, 238 officers-instructors, and 278
warrant officers and sergeants-instructors. Equipment included 68 Yak-18, 84 Yak-11 and UTB-2,
84 UTI, La-9, Utu-2, 84 La-9 and Tu-2, 12 Yak-12 and 2 Li- 2.16 In a resolution of the Soviet
Council of Ministers on November 4, 1949, the Soviet Union furnished China with 97 aviation
Board of "Russian Declassified Archives: Sino-Soviet Relations". “№00601 Liu Shaoqi to Stalin: Transmitting
Telegram of Mao Zedong (July 25, 1949)”（№00601 刘少奇致斯大林函：转交毛泽东的电报(1949 年 7 月 25 日)） in Vol.2
of Selected Russian Declassified Archives: Sino-Soviet Relations.（俄罗斯解密档案选编：中苏关系） (Beijing: Oriental
Publishing Center, 2015.) 83-85.
15 Ibid. “№16542 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union: Assistance to the People's Liberation Army
(September 19, 1949)”（№16542 苏联部长会议决议：为中国人民解放军提供援助(1949 年 9 月 19 日)）. 100-105.
16Ibid. 100-102
5
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school personnel and six Li-2 trainers.17 In 1950, Stalin called Kotov, who at that time, was
Soviet military attachéto China, to agree to provide all the liquid fuel needed for the training of
Chinese pilots.18 It can be said that the Soviet authorities showed almost no hesitation the
training of the Chinese Air Force pilots and provided China with all the necessary personnel and
equipment and logistical support.
by that time, meanwhile, the Guomindang troops had been completely defeated by the
People's Liberation Army in mainland China in late 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek had relocated the
Guomindang government to the island of Taiwan, from where he launched a strategic bombing
campaign of the Chinese mainland.19 The targets of the Guomindang Air Force were mostly
important coastal cities under PRC control. for example, Shanghai suffered 26 airstrikes from
October 1949 to February 1950. The largest airstrike occurred on February 6, 1950. On this day,
the Guomindang Air Force dispatched a total of 17 B-24, B-25 bombers and P-51, P-38 fighters,
which bombed targets such as the Shanghai Electric Power Company, the Shanghai South and
the Zhabei Hydropower Company, dropping more than 60 bombs and destroyed more than 2000
dwellings, while more than 1,400 residents were killed or injured. The bombs caused damage to
power plants and forced most factories to stop production, interfering with the CPC's efforts at
the restoration of the country's economy. The Shanghai authorities and residents became
17Ibid.

“№16558 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union: Provision of military technical assistance to the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (November 4, 1949)”（№16558 苏联部长会议决议：向中国人民解放军提供军事技术援
助(1949 年 11 月 4 日)） 145-148
18 Ibid. “№16581 Stalin to Kotov: agree to supply aviation fuel to China (January 8, 1950)”（№16581 斯大林致科托夫电：同
意为中国提供航空用油(1950 年 1 月 8 日)） 231-232
19 Xianzhi Pang, and Chongji Jin. Biography of Mao Zedong (1949-1976).（毛泽东传（1949-1976）
） (Beijing: Central Party
Literature Publishing House, 2003.) 62
6

despondent.20
To cope with this situation, in February 1950, China requested the Soviets to provide air
cover. Stalin agreed to provide support but proposed that China and Soviet Union should sign a
secret agreement stipulating that, in the Soviet Far East Territory and Central Asia, China's
Northeast and Xinjiang, "Concessions will not be provided to foreigners and third countries or
their citizens, industrial, financial, commercial, and other enterprises, agencies, companies, and
organizations that participate in investment directly or indirectly engage in (business)
activities."21 The Chinese side agreed after considerable consideration. Later, Stalin stated that
he wanted to hand over the Japanese and “Puppet Manchuria” property originally received by the
Soviets in the Northeast and the Russian-Orthodox's church in Beijing and a number of other
properties.22 As a result of the agreement, the Soviet Union dispatched an air defense group
army led by Lieutenant General Bakitsky to Xuzhou and Shanghai, including the 106th Fighter
Aviation Division, the 52nd Antiaircraft Artillery Division, the Guards Antiaircraft Searchlight
Corps, and an independent radio technology battalion, totaling 127 Planes. The aircraft includes
40 jet fighters, 41 piston fighters, 26 attackers, ten bombers, and ten transport aircraft.23 a month
after negotiations had concluded, on March 7, 1950, the first Soviet Air Force (the 351st Fighter
Aviation Regiment) entered Xuzhou Airport and took on security and patrol tasks. In the
Yazhi Wang, Zhihua Shen, and Danhui Li. Memories of Peng Dehuai’s Military Staff: Witnesses of Sino-Soviet Military
Relations in the 1950s.（彭德怀军事参谋的回忆：1950 年代中苏军事关系见证） 1st ed. (Shanghai: Fudan University press,
2009.) 9-10.
21 Pang and Jin, Biography, 62; Central Archives, Central Literature Research Office. Vol.2 of Zhou Enlai’s Manuscript since the
Founding.（建国以来周恩来文稿） (Central Literature Publishing House, 2008.) 78-79.
22 Pang and Jin, Biography, 62-63.
23 V. Nabokov, “Soviet Fighter Pilots in China in 1950,” Questions of History, no. 3 (2002): 140.
7
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subsequent air battles with the Guomindang aircraft, the Soviet Air Force had a clear advantage.
From March 8th to August 1st, it carried out 230 sorties, conducted seven air combats, and shot
down six enemy aircraft without any losses. The 106th Fighter Aviation Division completed the
combat mission to defend Shanghai and its surrounding areas, shooting down all enemy aircraft
trying to invade these areas without them being able to drop one a bomb in this region.
Regarding China's domestic security, although Stalin tried to profit from it, He could not gain
much advantage, due to China's strategic position and weak airpower; nonetheless, Stalin did not
have much hesitation assisting.24 During this period, whether out of loyalty toward treaty
obligations or a so-called proletarian brotherhood, Stalin did not hesitate to give China assistance
to fight the Guomindang following this precedent, Stalin did not need much urging in rendering
assistance to the Korean battlefield.

24

Ibid. 140-141
8

STALIN’S ATTITUDE WHEN THE UNITED STATES JUST
JOINED THE KOREAN WAR.
After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, President Harry S. Truman made a decision to
participate in the war on June 25, which surprised Stalin and Kim Il Sung. this surprise found its
roots in several previous developments First of all, in a speech of 12 January 1950, US Secretary
of State Dean Gooderham Acheson did not place South Korea within the defense circle of the
United States in the Far East; secondly, Kim Il Sung expressed the belief in talks with Stalin in
April 1950 that the United States had no time to prepare for this.25 However, the United States
Air Forces Far East Air Forces (FEAF), stationed in Japan and South Korea, responded quickly
to Truman's decision and began a continuous tactical and strategic bombing of North Korea on
June 27. The bombing run caused heavy losses to the Korean People's Army, with its air force
and navy being the first to bear the brunt. According to soviet ambassador Serentii F. Shtykov’s
report, on July 2, the U.S. Air Force repeatedly bombed settlements, production facilities and
military targets. Residents'(of North Korean) political emotions began to be frustrated, and
residents of the liberated areas began to watch the situation, and even a sense of defeatism

Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson’s Speech, Crisis in Asia - An Examination of U.S. Policy. Department of
State Bulletin, XXII, No.551. (washington, D.C.: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950.) Zhihua, Shen.
“Tunkin to Wisinski about meeting Kim Il Sung”（顿金关于会晤金日成情况致维辛斯基电） in Vol. 1 of Korean War:
Declassified Files in Russian Archives.（朝鲜战争：俄国档案馆的解密文件） 1st ed. (Taiwan: Academia Sinica Institute of
Modern History, 2003.) 238-241.
9
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appeared.26 After this report, Stalin realized that DPRK's victory in the war might not be
smoothly accomplished. He needed to consider how to increase direct military assistance to
North Korea, but such assistance could not be seen to come from Moscow, as he didn’t want the
conflict to escalate into a total Soviet-U.S. war.
The assistance of the Soviet Union before the war to the PRK mainly involved training the
Korean army, providing weapons and equipment, and formulating combat plans. Stalin barred
Soviet soldiers from crossing the 38th parallel and directly participating in the invasion of South
Korea.27 At the beginning of the attack, Stalin also ordered the recall of all Soviet advisers in the
frontline forces of the Korean People's Army. At that time, Khrushchev asked the reason and
Stalin replied: " It's too dangerous to let our advisers live there, they might become captives. We
do not want to leave evidence to be accused of our involvement in this incident."28 When
Khrushchev further questioned this, Stalin ignored him.29 It was precisely because of the lack of
guidance from Soviet advisers that the North Korean army that had continued to advance south
collapsed into chaos. After taking Seoul, even Shtykov had to plead with Stalin to approve two
Soviet advisers to each army of the People's Army and hoped that military advisor general
Vasilyev would join the officer group at Seoul to the front command and stay there with the

Editorial Board of "Russian Declassified Archives”, “№00281 Shtykov to Stalin: Political sentiment of North Korean leaders
(July 2, 1950) ”（ №00281 什特科夫致斯大林电：朝鲜领导人的政治情绪(1950 年 7 月 2 日)）462-464.
27 D. Volkogonov, “Should We Be Afraid of This？,” Spark, no. 26 (1993): 29.
28 Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev's Memoirs,（赫鲁晓夫回忆录） Trans. Zhao zhaoli, etc. (Beijing, China Radio and Television
Publishing House,1988.)360-361.
29 Ibid..
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senior North-Korean commanders.30 Stalin ignored the request to send Soviet advisers and only
responded that Vasilyev "is more suitable to live in Pyongyang."31 Nevertheless later, in
response to a direct request of Kim Il Sung, Stalin promised to send some Soviet advisers into
North Korea. On the one hand, he severely condemned Shtykov's actions, and warned him that
"you are the ambassador of the Soviet Union, not North Korea" and stated that Shtykov would be
held personally accountable to the Soviet government to make sure no Soviet advisers would be
captured.32 Meanwhile, it was made clear that these advisors were "sent to (the) front line
command, not the combat forces," and that they were sent "dressed as civilians and as Pravda
reporters," and not as soldiers. Meanwhile, Stalin began to think of asking for assistance from the
Chinese army when necessary.33 When and how to provide such assistance depended on the
development of the war situation.
U.S. participation the war attracted the attention of Chinese leaders as well. On July 2nd,
CPC politburo member and prime minister Zhou Enlai summoned the Soviet ambassador
Roshchin and requested to be allowed to inform the Soviet government of the Chinese leaders’
judgment on the situation North Korea. He pointed out that in order to prevent the U.S. troops
from landing, the Korean People's Army should accelerate its southward advance, capture ports

Shen. “Stykov to Stalin's Telegram: Questions about the reorganization of the Korean People's Army”（什特科夫关于朝鲜人
民军整编问题致斯大林电） in Declassified Files in Russian Archives.（俄国档案馆的解密文件） 427-429
31 Editorial Board of "Russian Declassified Archives”, “№00285 Stalin to Shtykov: Supply of weapons and equipment to North
Korea via Northeast China (July 6, 1950)”（ №00285 斯大林致什特科夫电：经中国东北向朝鲜提供武器装备(1950 年 7
月 6 日)）465.
32 Shen, “Shtkov to Stalin: to relay Kim Il-sung's request to send Soviet advisers”（什特科夫转呈金日成关于派遣苏联顾问的
请求致斯大林电）in Declassified Files in Russian Archives.（俄国档案馆的解密文件）438
33 Ibid.
11
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in the south, and build a strong garrison important coast areas like Incheon. Zhou Enlai believes
that the Chinese army can wear the Korean People's Army clothing and fight as volunteers when
necessary, such as when the United Nations forces cross the 38th parallel. To this end, China
would concentrate three military forces in Shenyang, with a total of a strength of 120,000.
Finally, Zhou Enlai asked whether the Soviet Air Force could ensure air cover for these forces.
China 's Northeast Frontier Defense Forces were formally established only a few days later,
and ordered to be ready by August 5.34 Zhou Enlai said this before making a formal decision the
matter, apparently intent on letting Stalin know that Chinese leaders were willing to help North
Korea, but at the same time let Stalin understand that Soviet air force was one of the conditions
for China to send troops.
Stalin responded immediately. Replying on July 5:

“We believe that it is correct to immediately concentrate 9 Chinese divisions on the
China-DPRK border so that the volunteers will enter North Korea when the enemy crosses
the 38th parallel. We will do our best to provide air cover for these forces.35 "

Central Literature Research Office, Central Archives. Vol.1 of Mao Zedong’s Manuscript since the Founding.（建国以来毛泽
东文稿） (Central Literature Publishing House, 1987.) 428
35 Editorial Board of "Russian Declassified Archives”, №00284 Stalin sends a message to Roshchin: Questions about the buildup
of Chinese troops at the border between China and North Korea (July 5, 1950),（№00284 斯大林致罗申电：关于中国军队在
中朝边境集结的问题(1950 年 7 月 5 日)）563
12
34

As no further news from China was received, Stalin again asked Roshchin to tell Zhou Enlai
or Mao Zedong on July 13:"

We don't know if you have decided to deploy 9 Chinese divisions on the border between
China and North Korea. If you have decided to do so, then we are going to send you an
aviation division equipped with 124 jet fighters to cover these forces. We plan to train
Chinese pilots with our pilots for two to three months and then transfer all the equipment to
your pilots. We intend to let the aviation division Shanghai do the same."36

These two documents show that in order to urge China to make up its mind and prepare for
sending troops to North Korea as soon as possible, Stalin made a clear commitment at the time:
In addition to the Soviet Union training China 's air force and provide China with air force
equipment, it would also provide air cover to Chinese troops "into North Korea." That is, the
Soviet Air Force would fight side by side with the Chinese army. However, Stalin did set as a
condition here that the timing of China's troop dispatch (of course also the Soviet Air Force) is
"when the enemy crosses the 38th parallel."
The FEAF bombing caused Pyongyang to panic. Starting on June 29, the U.S. Air Force
continuously launched bombers to bomb North Korean airports in Pyongyang and other regions.

Ibid. “№00293 Stalin sends a message to Roshen: Preparations for Air Force Assistance to China (July 13, 1950)”（№00293 斯
大林致罗申电：准备向中国提供空军援助(1950 年 7 月 13 日)） 568.
13
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Carrier-based aircraft of U.S.N. Task Force 77 began to seize air control in North Korea.37 Faced
with the advantages of the U.S. Air Force, the Yak fighters of the Korean People's Army Air
Force proved completely incapable of stopping the operations of the U.S. bombers, and they
could at most occasionally win air battles through unexpected attacks.38 On July 7, Kim Il Sung
met with Shtykov and asked the Soviet military adviser to move to Seoul as soon as possible and
participate in the military command of the various legions. Otherwise, the People's Army would
face "failure" and "collapse." Kim Il Sung added that officials from many places had reported to
him that the local area was heavily bombed by the US Air Force. Many railway junctions and
bridges had been severely damaged. According to Shtykov, Kim Il Sung was "distracted and
slightly frustrated" for the first time since the outbreak of the war.39 Stalin instead hoped China
could resolve this. In a July 8 telegram, he instructed Roshchin:

“Please inform Mao Zedong that the Koreans are complaining that there is no Chinese
representative in North Korea. Representatives should be sent as soon as possible to
facilitate contact and solve the problem, that is, if Mao feels it necessary to contact North
Korea."40

37

Robert Frank Futrell, Lawson S Moseley, and Albert F Simpson. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.) 6-13
38 Ibid. 7-19
39 Editorial Board of "Russian Declassified Archives”, “№20062 Shtykov to Stalin: transport of weapons via Chinese railways, and
more (July 8, 1950)”（№20062 什特科夫致斯大林电：经中国铁路运送武器等事(1950 年 7 月 8 日)） 566-567
40 Shen, “Stalin to Roshchin: China should send representatives to North Korea as soon as possible”（斯大林关于中国应尽快向
朝鲜派出代表问题致罗申电） in Declassified Files in Russian Archives.（俄国档案馆的解密文件）437.
14

communist China was actively preparing at this time to get involved in the Korean war.
While the troops were Amassing northeast, Chinese leaders were stepping up their battle
planning. On July 13, Zhou Enlai entrusted the Chinese representative in North Korea to tell Kim
Il Sung that American intervention the war in North Korea could not be tolerated, and the
Chinese government was prepared to provide as much assistance as possible to North Korea in
this war. In order to meet the needs of North Korea promptly, Kim should not hesitate to ask for
help; at the same time, China hope North Korea could provide China with a total of Five hundred
pieces of maps of North Korea with scales of 1 to 100,000, 1 to 200,000, and 1 to 500,000. China
also asks North Korea to report the situation of the front line and send samples of North Korean
military uniforms as soon as possible "41

Kim Il Sung reported this situation to the Soviet

ambassador promptly. During the talks, Kim Il Sung sadly noted that the participation of the US
military, especially the attack by the United States Air Force, "has led to the destruction of a
large number of North Korean cities and industrial enterprises. KPA was constantly suffering
bombardment, and the advancement of the People's Army was hindered. "42 Kim Il Sung also
proposed that, "Since the United States and other countries have stood on the side of Syngman
Rhee and participated in the war, then democratic countries such as Czechoslovakia and China
can also use their military to help North Korea."43 Shtykov deliberately avoided this issue, but
only said that Kim’s most important task at present was to mobilize all internal forces, strengthen
Editorial Board of "Russian Declassified Archives”, “№20066 Shtykov to Stalin: North Korean government asks China for
military assistance (July 15, 1950)”（№20066 什特科夫致斯大林电：朝鲜政府要求中国给予军事援助(1950 年 7 月 15 日)）
669
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
15
41

the army, consolidate the liberated areas, and ensure and enhance his influence among the
Korean people.44
On July 19, Kim Il Sung again reported to Shtykov on the talks between his representative in
Beijing and Mao Zedong: Mao Zedong believed that the United States would participate in the
war for a long time and would deploy more troops in North Korea. Mao Zedong suggested that
Kim Il Sung "order the troops to stop attacking the enemy in order to save their main force," and
"promise to North Korea 30,000 rifles, 2000 portable machine guns, 200 heavy machine guns,
300 81 mm mortars and 1,000 mules. All these supplies will start shipping on July 25."45
Kim Il Sung also reported that in order to understand the situation of the Korean War, Mao
Zedong wanted to send Zhou Enlai to North Korea, but because of the difficulty of flying, he had
to ask Kim Il Sung to send military representatives to China instead. Besides, Mao Zedong also
said that if North Korea needed assistance, China "can send its troops to North Korea. China has
prepared four corps for a total of 320,000 people" and hopes that Kim Il Sung will report their
situation by August 10. "46When Kim Il Sung asked Moscow for his opinion on this issue,
Shtykov replied: He knew nothing about it. Kim Il Sung also said that he thought that Mao
Zedong might have negotiated with Stalin, but did not expect that this was just Mao Zedong's
own thoughts. Shtykov again said he did not know of this. Finally, the Soviet ambassador
requested in a telegram that Moscow present its views on China's troop dispatch as soon as
44
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possible in order to respond to Kim Il Sung in the future.47 Stalin did not answer to this. It
seemed that Stalin was calmer than Kim Il Sung and Shtykov. Before the critical moment,
Moscow did not want to let the Chinese army intervene in the war. After several trials, Kim Il
Sung understood Stalin‘s attitude.
On July 18, Moscow received a long comprehensive report from the Soviet embassy on the
situation North Korea. The central message was that North Korean leaders and residents had
shaken off their initial panic and regained their confidence in victory. The report said that
immediately after being attacked by the U.S. Air Force, North Koreans feared that they would
not be able to defeat U.S. armed interventionists without armed assistance from the Soviet Union
and China. However, with the advancement of the People's Army southward, especially after
fighting with US forces on July 5 and 11 and inflicting heavy damage and captives on a large
number of American soldiers, "the people's fighting spirit has been restored."48 The number of
people actively requesting to be sent to the front line increased sharply, and within a few days,
745,000 volunteer troops were formed. The liberated cities, especially Seoul, soon resumed
normal life, established socialist’s power institutions, and mobilized local resources to help the
front line. The victories of the People's Army also revived the southern guerrilla movement. The
report concluded that North Koreans had restored their confidence to quickly reach a final
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victory.49 In August, the soviet embassy in North Korea submitted a report with the same
conclusion to Moscow again, with the incidental mention that North Korean officials and
the ”Korean masses“ expressed their dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's failure to send the
air force in time to stop the bombing of American aircraft.50 An optimistic estimate of the
development of the war situation is probably one of the reasons why Stalin was not eager to
consider providing direct military assistance to North Korea. On the other hand, the eagerness of
Mao Zedong to send troops to North Korea may have also caused Stalin's doubts-one
consequence of China's sending troops was to expand its position and influence in North Korea.
In the long run, this was not good for the Soviet Union’s strategic position the far east.
Soon after the us began to bomb North-Korean targets, Mao Zedong was thinking about
sending troops, especially after receiving the promise of air force assistance from the Soviet
Union. On July 22, Mao Zedong replied to Stalin:

We will use one of your jet divisions to cover our army, and plan to deploy it in the
Shenyang area. Two regiments will be deployed in Anshan and one regiment. in
Liaoyang, with the cooperation of the fighter aviation groups of our mixed aviation
brigade in Andong, this will help to complete the task of providing air cover for our
army and the industrial zones of Shenyang, Andong and Fushun.51
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At the same time, Mao Zedong also discussed the work arrangements for training Chinese
pilots and announced that the Chinese planned to complete the work of receiving all the weapons
and equipment and modification training of the two Soviet aviation divisions by March to April
1951. In this regard, the Soviet Union wholeheartedly agreed.52 The previous day, on July 21,
the Soviet Council of Ministers had drawn up relevant resolutions. According to these resolutions,
on July 22, Soviet Military Minister Vasilevsky instructed military general counsel Krasovsky
and Batitsky in China to hand over all the aircraft of the Batitzki air fleet in Shanghai. On August
1, the formation of the air defense group in Shanghai was canceled, and all equipment was
transferred to the Chinese Hybrid Aviation Brigade concentrated in the Shanghai-Xuzhou area
waiting for conversion training. On August 10, the 151st Fighter Aviation Division of the Soviet
Union finally completed its assembly missions in Shenyang, Liaoyang, Anshan, and other
places.53
Perhaps because China's proposal to send troops did not get a response from North Korea,
Mao Zedong decided to present this idea to Moscow through another channel. On August 19 and
28, Mao Zedong talked twice with the Soviet philosopher Pavel Yudin, who assisted in editing
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the Selected Works of Mao Zedong in Beijing, and was known to be close to Stalin. Mao Zedong
talked about two possibilities for things to happen: If Americans used only their current forces in
North Korea, they might soon be kicked out of the peninsula and never return. However, if the
United States was determined to succeed in North Korea, they would need 30 to 40 divisions. In
this case, North Koreans alone could not deal with them, and they needed China's direct
assistance. If such assistance was provided, these 30 to 40 divisions from in the United States
could be eliminated. If this plan could be realized, it would delay the outbreak of World War III,
which was beneficial to both the Soviet Union and China. Mao Zedong's remarks were, of course,
intended for Moscow’s ears.54 However, Stalin remained unmoved, although Kim Il Sung
continued to request such large-scale military assistance from the PRC.
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BEFORE BATTLE OF INCHON AND THE HESITANT
MOSCOW AUTHORITIES
After mid-August, the People's Army's offensive was blocked on the front line of the
Nakdong River, and Kim Il Sung again showed anxiety and disappointment. On August 19, Kim
Il Sung's secretary was entrusted to see Shtykov. The secretary said that, while he was lying in
bed, Kim Il Sung had become "worried" about the fact that frontline troops were forced to
abandon the offensive due to the uninterrupted cluster bombing of American aircraft. "Kim Il
Sung requested to send an international air force to provide air cover for the Korean People's
Army forces. Otherwise, the conditions for the troops' fighting would be too difficult."55 Without
Moscow's instructions, Shtykov could only continue to take an evasive attitude and suggested
that the Korean People's Army "should quickly replenish the troop strength and put the reserve
forces into combat in order to move forward as soon as possible."56 Shtykov also reported that "
Kim Il Sung's mood has been somewhat depressed recently," and he was "a little worried about
whether the People's Army can stick to the front line."57 Because the North Korean Air Force
suffered heavy losses and was unable to fight the enemy, Kim Il Sung had to wholly rely on the
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assistance from the Soviet Air Force.
On August 26, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador over the phone that, according
to the information he had, the Americans planned to land in Incheon and Suwon. The DPRK
planned plans to take the necessary measures to strengthen defense in the areas mentioned above.
They were considering the inconvenience of raising the issue that the Soviets had been avoiding
again. That night, Kim Il Sung said to Shtykov again through his secretary "still wanted to ask
the Chinese comrades to send troops to assist North Korea because the current frontline situation
is too difficult. "But he wanted to know Moscow's opinion on this and several times thought of
writing to Stalin.58 Kim Il Sung also wanted to refer this issue to the Politburo of the Workers'
Party of Korea for discussion. Seeing that Shtykov had no intention of talking about this topic,
the secretary quickly changed his mind and said that the above issues were all on his initiative,
and Kim Il Sung did not ask him to discuss these issues.59 Shtykov reported that in the recent
period, Kim Il Sung had become increasingly unsure of winning the war on his own strength, and
therefore repeatedly tried to obtain the consent of the Soviet embassy in order to ask the Chinese
army to help North Korea. However, Kim Il Sung has never mentioned this issue again after this
trial. The Chinese provided the information that Kim Il Sung said about the United States'
intention to land in Incheon. Mao Zedong wrote to Stalin by telegram on October 2nd:
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"Also when Comrade Kim Il Sung arrived in Beijing in April this year, we told him to
pay serious attention to the possibility of foreign reactionary forces invading North Korea. In
mid-July, late July, and early September, we told comrades of North Korea three times that
they would be aware of the danger that the enemy would advance from the sea to Incheon
and Seoul to cut off the back road of the People 's Army. They should retreat to the north in a
proper time, preserving the main force, and fighting for victory in a long war. "60

Mao Zedong did nothing more than remind Kim Il Sung using his war experience: If he
wanted to win, he must rely on the assistance of the Chinese army. In early September, on the
repeated urging of Mao Zedong, the strength of the Northeast Frontier Force was planned to
increase to 700,000, while another 200,000 were recruited, and weapons and equipment were
strengthened. China was undoubtedly doing this to guard against possible actions by the United
States, and Kim Il Sung asked Moscow for the issue of asking China to send troops.61
Stalin could not ignore it anymore, but rejected Kim Il Sung's request for international
assistance. In a telegram on August 28, Stalin first told Kim Il Sung that "the Central Committee
of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) does not doubt that foreign interference will be expelled
from North Korea soon."62!Then Stalin reassured, "Don't be uneasy because you haven't
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achieved consecutive victories in the struggle with foreign interferers. Victory is sometimes
accompanied by some setbacks or even partial defeat. There is no continuous victory in such a
war.63 "The situation of the Russians during 1919 British, French, and American armed
intervention was much more difficult than that of the current North Korean comrades. "Stalin
finally agreed to Kim Il Sung," If necessary, we can provide the North Korean Air Force with
attackers and fighter jets. "64After hearing Stalin's clear opinion directly, Kim Il Sung was" very
happy and thanked many times "and repeatedly emphasized that this letter was very important
and should be communicated to members of the Politburo. Kim Il Sung explained, "Some
members of the Politburo are not in the right mood. It is good for them to understand the content
of this letter."65 On August 31, Kim Il Sung wrote a passionate letter to Stalin: "Dear mentor, we
thank you for your uncle's teaching. We have received your great support at the crucial moment
of the Korean people's struggle." After Stalin's claim, Kim Il Sung placed all his hopes on
Moscow.66
However, Stalin became more cautious at this time. Not only did he not provide air force
assistance to North Korea in a timely manner, but even the original mission of providing cover
for the Chinese army stopped. On August 28, Vasilevsky reported that, in light of the U.S. planes
conducting airstrikes and raids on residential areas and train stations in northeast China on
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August 27, the Ministry of Defense requested permission to let the 151st Fighter Division that
had assembled there take the combat mission to provide air cover for the Northeast Frontier
Force (13th Corps). The report required approval of the draft order issued to divisional
commander Belov. The order said:

"1. While completing the retraining mission for Chinese pilots, starting from September 1
this year, the 151st Fighter Aviation Division, with the cooperation of ground anti-aircraft
artillery units, will be deployed in Tonghua, Tieling, Liaoyang and An'an. The 13th Corps of the
People's Liberation Army in the East and other regions provide air cover.
2. During the cover mission, the 151st Fighter Aviation Division aircraft must not fly across
the border of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.
3. The 13th Corps Command (located in Andong) together with the People 's Liberation
Army ground anti-aircraft artillery unit. The division 's air cover action plan must be submitted to
the Soviet General Staff (review) through the most convenient diplomatic mail channel of the
Consulate General of the Soviet Union Shenyang.
4. Reports of activities involving air combat must be reported to the Chief of the General
Staff of the Soviet Union a coded password via the hotline immediately before 20:00 every day.67
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The next day, the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers Bulganin instructed in the
document: "Return to А.М.Vasilevsky", and that was the end of the reply.68 On August 31,
Vasilevsky again submitted a report asking, "is it necessary to order the 151st Fighter Division to
train Chinese pilots while also providing air cover for the People's Liberation Army in the
region?"69 Proposed by a decision of the (Soviet) government. This time, Bulganin simply ticked
off the few inquiries in the report.70 Bulganin obviously did so with Stalin's permission, and
probably even with Stalin's intention.
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In addition, Stalin also decided to redeploy the strength of the Air Force deployed in the
Shenyang area to strengthen the Lushun naval base. According to the resolution of the Political
Bureau of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the USSR on September 13, the Ministry of
Defense Order ordered that the 151st Fighter Aviation Division was to end its retraining of
Chinese pilots in the Shenyang area on February 1, 1951. While sending its two regiments and
the command authority to Lushun base, together with the 177th Regiment of the 303rd Aviation
Division and an Aviation Machinery Battalion transferred from Vladivostok on October 6. These
units will be formed as a new MiG-15 fighter division.71 This fully shows that Stalin attached
great importance to the status of Lushun Port. At that time, the cover of the Chinese army that is
going to fight abroad was no longer on the mission schedule of the Soviet Air Force. However,
the rapidly changing situation of Korean War disrupted this deployment of Stalin.
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AFTER THE BATTLE OF INCHON
From September 14th to 18th, Stalin kept receiving disturbing battle reports: US troops
landed in Incheon, and the situation North Korea changed significantly. According to a report by
the Soviet General Staff, on September 13, the U.S. military began a small-scale reconnaissance
landing operation the Incheon area, but no major changes took place in the frontline battle
situation. On September 15, the U.S. military had gathered about 150 ships and began landing in
the Incheon area under cover of ship-borne artillery and aircraft. The main force was the 10th
U.S. Army. The NK People's Army has only one Marine Corps and two border battalions to
defend. Due to road and communication interruptions, the situation of the troops transferred to
the areas of Incheon and Seoul was unknown. After the U.S. army successfully landed, it broke
through to Seoul, and the People's Army's defense line collapsed. U.S. and South Korean
coalition forces on the southern front had begun a fierce counterattack that succeeded. On
September 17, the U.S. landing force crossed the Han River, and in the Seoul suburbs the
fighting was fiercely. Due to the indiscriminate bombing of the United States Air Force, all
railways and bridges from the Chinese border to the front line were destroyed, and traffic had
been paralyzed.72
The Chinese leadership responded immediately to the sudden change in the situation North
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Korea. On September 18, Zhou Enlai summoned Roshchin and the military advisers Kotov and
Konov.73 Zhou Enlai was dissatisfied because that information provided by North Korea to
China on military issues was few and they were eager to gain that. He indicated China had tried
to send some military-technical attachés to North Korea to gain the information of the situation
on the battlefield, but so far, they had not received any reply from Pyongyang. The Chinese was
lack of the intelligence of the Korean People’s Army neither their combat plan nor the real
situation on the battlefield. According to official announcements, Zhou Enlai suggested that if
North Korea’s sufficient reserves was less than 100,000 people, they should withdraw their
principal force north to set up an assault group and use it in a decisive battle. Zhou Enlai also
repeated and urgent requested the Soviet government that Chinese leadership need more accurate
intelligence. In the end, Zhou Enlai indicated inadvertently that, the western world had not
prepared for a long, large-scale war, western countries are now anxious that if the Soviet Union
and China intervene the military conflict in North Korea. "This fear should be used to take steps
that prove our intention. In this respect, the movement of the Chinese army from the south to the
northeast is enough to disturb the British and American governments."74 Zhou Enlai ask that the
Soviet government be notified and responded as soon as possible.75 Moscow responded on the
20th that admitted North Korea's failure in provide military information a timely manner,
because they were young and inexperienced. As for China's proposal to fight North Korea, the
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Soviet Union agreed to immediately withdraw the principal force of the People's Army to the
north and establish a Seoul defense line. However, Zhou Enlai's request in Chinese troop
dispatch had not responded by Stalin.76 Zhou Enlai had to advise Kim Il Sung to concentrate his
forces to ensure the 38th parallel, "adhering to the general policy of self-reliance and long-term
struggle.”77 On September 21, Liu Shaoqi once again told Roshchin that "Chinese leaders
believed that the Chinese revolution has not ended…Fighting against US imperialism will
accelerate the final victory" and that "if the United States prevailed in North Korea, China has an
obligation to help Comrade North Korea."78
While raising the issue of aid to the DPRK to Moscow, Zhou Enlai also asked North Korea's
opinions. On September 19, Zhou Enlai summoned North Korean Ambassador to China Li
Zhouyuan, and told him the same things he had told Roshchin the previous day, and further
asked, "After the Incheon landing in the United States," what's the North Korean government's
requirements for the Chinese government next? "
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On the same day, Li Zhouyuan telegrammed

Kim Il Sung's original words: "The Korean people are preparing for a long battle." In addition,
there was no news from North Korea in Beijing.80 On the 20th, Kim Il Sung reported the content
of Zhou Enlai's talk to the Soviet ambassador and explained that there was an agreement between
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China and North Korea that if the enemy landed behind their forces, the Chinese would use their
own army to help North Korea. Kim Il Sung hopes Shtykov can give advice on this agreement,
Soviet ambassador did not comment on this. Kim Il Sung then expressed his concerns, saying
that the Chinese army had gained a lot of experience in previous wars, but what would happen to
them in the context of the continuous bombardment of a large number of American aircraft. The
Chinese army will struggle to guarantee their operational efficiency. The Koreans present echoed,
saying, "If the Chinese army is allowed to fight in North Korea without the air force providing
air cover for it, the battle will still be quite difficult."81 North Korean Foreign Minister Park
Hyun-yong made it clear that he "wants China to participate in the war in North Korea." Because
he had not been instructed by Moscow, Shtykov "had avoided answering this question."82
On September 21, the Political Bureau of the Korean Workers' Party held a meeting to
discuss how to respond to Zhou Enlai's proposal. Park Hyun-Yong, Kim Min-bong (President of
the Supreme People's Assembly), and Park Yi-woo (Minister of the Interior) all agreed that North
Korea was clearly unable to defeat Americans on its own, and must ask the Chinese government
to send troops into North Korea. But Kim Il Sung said in a speech: "We used to think that we had
a large population and could do everything with our own strength. The Soviet Union gave us all
the weapons we required. Why should we ask the Chinese for help?"83 He believed that "the
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Soviet Union and China would not allow Americans to completely occupy North Korea." In the
end, Kim Il Sung suggested: "for the time being not to pass a resolution on requesting assistance
from the Chinese government, but to write a letter to Comrade Stalin first and consult his
opinions on whether to ask for assistance from the Chinese military."84 Kim Il Sung emphasized,
"If you ask the Chinese army for help without asking the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union may
complain that is it not enough for us to use consultants and weapons to assist North Korea?"85
He also said that if North Korea accelerated the formation of a new army, there is no need to ask
the Chinese. As a result of the discussions at the meeting, no resolution was adopted.86 Kim Il
Sung was now watching Stalin's attitude, but as long as the enemy has not crossed the 38th line,
Stalin would not be willing to send Chinese troops. On September 26, Stalin's military
representative sent to North Korea noted that the 3,400 cars shipped to North Korea did not have
enough drivers. In order to solve the transportation problem, "Can you suggest that Kim Il Sung
ask Chinese friends to send more than 1,500 drivers to North Korea?"87 Stalin responded four
days later: "You can suggest this to Kim Il Sung, but don't say: This is what Moscow means."88
Shortly after the Incheon landing, Stalin conceived of the idea of sending the Soviet Air
Force to protect Pyongyang. According to Stalin's instructions, Vasilevsky reported on
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September 21 that 40 Jacques 9 aircraft of the 84th Regiment of the 147th Aviation Division
could be sent to protect Pyongyang. The aviation regiment could arrive in two days but was not
fully prepared. Preparation was to take 8-10 days.89 Two days later, Vasilevsky reported that he
had decided to relocate the 304th Regiment of the 32nd Fighter Aircraft Division:

"On October 3rd, the regiment can begin the combat mission to defend Pyongyang." (However,
Vasilevsky finally reported): "After the first air battle, the battle of our pilots to defend
Pyongyang will be discovered by the Americans, because all the command of the air battle will
be conducted by wireless telephone in Russian."90

Maybe the military minister's words reminded Stalin that perhaps the drastically changing
situation North Korea forced him to reconsider his countermeasures. In short, at the critical
moment, Soviet fighters did not appear over Pyongyang.
On September 30, Moscow received a report from Shtykov: Seoul may have fallen, and the
road to the north of the People's Army's main force has been cut off and lost contact. Kim Il Sung
was worried that the enemy would cross the 38th parallel, and North Korea was unable to form
new troops to resist effectively. The NK Politburo discussed and approved a letter to Stalin,
asking the Soviet Union for air force assistance, and also drafted a letter to Mao Zedong pleading
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for help. They were now panicking and lacking confidence, and didn’t know what to do.91 On
the night of the same day, Kim Il Sung came for a letter of help asking for Stalin's "direct
military assistance," and if that did not work, "please help us build an international volunteer
force in China and other people's democratic countries."92 Facing such an emergency, Moscow
finally gave the green light to the Chinese army. On October 1, Stalin called Mao Zedong:

"I'm on vacation away from Moscow, and I don't know much about the situation North
Korea. However, from the report that Moscow gave me today, I learned that Comrade North
Korea was in trouble."93

A dangerous situation, that is, North Korea has no resistance force, and the road to the
38th parallel was not fortified. Stalin asked the Chinese army to enter the war in the form of
volunteers and organize the defense in the area north of the 38th parallel. Perhaps because of
Moscow's previous reactions to China's troop dispatch, Stalin finally said: "I haven't talked to
Comrade North Korea about this, and I don't plan to talk about it… But I don't doubt when they
learn that It will be very happy afterward. "94
After receiving the telegram, Mao Zedong couldn't wait to draft a callback, agreeing to send
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troops early the next morning. However, this idea was questioned at the meeting of the CCP
leaders, and Mao Zedong had to reply to Moscow: China will not send troops for the time being,
but the relevant issues will be discussed again. Under the vigorous support of Mao Zedong and
Peng Dehuai, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China on the afternoon of October 5 decided to send troops to fight in North
Korea. Subsequently, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army was formally established, and the
troops entered the final preparation stage before the war.95 Although the decision to send troops
has been made, the hesitation and worry of Chinese leaders Were justified. Regarding the timing
of sending troops, if the Chinese army could help defend the rear before Incheon's landing so that
the main force of the People's Army could hold the front line; after the Incheon's landing, the
Chinese army could establish a line of defense on the 38th parallel to prevent the enemy's
continued northward advance. Then, by the beginning of October, when the main force of the
People ’s Army was completely exhausted and the 38th parallel had been breached, A good
opportunity for the Chinese army to enter North Korea no longer existed. No wonder MacArthur
pledged to Truman on Wake Island that China would never send troops to North Korea at this
time, otherwise, "for them, that would be the biggest slaughter."96 However, MacArthur also
pointed out another possibility, that is, China's provided the ground forces, the Soviet Union
dispatched the Air Force, "to carry out joint operations."97 But he thought it was nothing
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terrible.98 This was exactly what Mao Zedong and the Chinese leaders were expecting at that
time.
From a combat point of view, compared with the US military, the biggest weakness of the
Chinese army was that its weapons and equipment were obsolete, and there was no air support.
Mao Zedong noticed this problem from the beginning and informed Stalin. In a telegraph drafted
on October 2, Mao Zedong not only listed a large number of weapons and equipment, including
tanks, heavy artillery and thousands of cars, but also mentioned that "the enemy has air
dominance, and the batch of air forces we started training will not reach 1951… only more than
300 aircraft can be used for combat in February," so the Soviet Union was required to provide air
force support when the Chinese army was dispatched.99 If Stalin did not know the content of this
telegram because it had not been sent, the information transmitted from other channels should be
very clear. On October 7, Matviyev, Stalin's personal representative in North Korea, reported that
Park Yiyu had returned from Beijing on October 5. During his stay in Beijing, he twice met Mao
Zedong and the leaders of the Chinese Communist Part for a total of 10 hours. Mao Zedong said,
I can do my best to help North Korea, but I cannot send troops. The reason is that, first, China's
troop dispatch will inevitably drag the Soviet Union to war, which will lead to the Third World
War; second, although the Chinese army is large in number, it does not have modern weapons
and equipment, Anything like either a serious Air Force or a Navy.100 Mao Zedong's
98
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conversation with the Soviets was even more direct. Mao spoke with Roshchin on October 6th,
saying that he was very pleased with Stalin's statement that China and the Soviet Union should
jointly attack the United States, and emphasized that if they were to fight, they should do it
immediately. He had said the same thing at the Politburo meeting just concluded. Speaking about
the issue of Chinese troops, Mao Zedong emphasized that the technical equipment of the Chinese
army was very backward and "completely counted on Soviet assistance."101 In the talk, Mao
Zedong "was particularly concerned about the Air Force."102 He pointed out that China 's troop
dispatch "must have an Air Force," and its tasks were to cover Chinese ground forces sent to
North Korea; participate in front-line operations; and cover China 's major industries
Centers-Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, Shenyang (Anshan and Fushun). Mao Zedong finally said
that in order to report on China's relevant situation and all thoughts, he must immediately send
Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to the Soviet Union.103
On October 8, Mao Zedong officially notified Kim Il-sung and Stalin, respectively, that
China had decided to form a volunteer army to assist North Korea. The troops began to enter the
DPRK around October 15. Following this, the news was exchanged between Moscow and
Pyongyang. Everyone was relieved that China finally decided to send troops, , and Kim Il Sung
was really happy and made arrangements for the time, place, and method of Chinese army
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assembly in North Korea.104 But it all seemed too late, given the rapid us advance northward.
Stalin did not feel happy, he was waiting uneasily for Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, who had entered
the border of the Soviet Union.
On October 11, Zhou Enlai and others flew to Stalin’s retreat at Sochi on the Black Sea via
Moscow and held talks with Soviet leaders that afternoon. Zhou Enlai introduced the situation of
the CPC Political Bureau meeting to discuss the situation in the DPRK and the issue of troop
assistance It shows that China would face huge practical difficulties in sending troops,
emphasizing the need for the Soviet Union to provide weapons and equipment and air force
support. Stalin pointed out that it could fully meet the military equipment requirements such as
aircraft, tanks, and artillery that China needed to resist the United States and aid North Korea.
However, the Soviet Air Force was not ready and could only be dispatched after two or two and a
half months. After repeated discussions, the two sides believed that since everyone was not ready,
they had to abandon North Korea and notify Kim Il-sung as soon as possible to arrange a
withdrawal. After the meeting, Stalin and Zhou Enlai jointly called Mao Zedong to point out: If
direct assistance is not provided within a month by a considerable number of well-equipped
troops, North Korea will be invaded by Americans because the North Korean army north of the
38th parallel cannot stop them. Because the air force performing cover missions would not be in
place for at least two months, it would take at least six months to equip and train Chinese troops,

Ibid. “№20092 Shtykov to Stalin: Kim Il Sung feels bright (October 8, 1950)" 81; “A Set of Telegrams about the Chinese
People’s Volunteers Dispatching North Korean Operations,”（关于中国人民志愿军出动朝鲜作战的一组文电） Archive of the
Party（党的文献）, no. 5 (2000): 3-4..
38
104

and at that time, assistance to North Korea would be meaningless, so China had decided not to
send troops. The telegram concluded asking for Mao's decision.105
The reason why Zhou Enlai accepted that China should not send troops is obviously because
the Soviet Union did not fully meet China's conditions for sending troops, and this should be
Mao Zedong's condition he had promised Peng Dehuai to which Zhou Enlai had agreed in
advance. Peng Dehuai convened a meeting of cadres Commanding the volunteer army in
Shenyang on October 9 to explain the current situation and the central intentions. Although "all
preparations are not sufficient, but in order to fight for time," it was decided to send two troops to
begin dispatching on October 15th to gather in the front lines of Heecheon and Tokugawa.106
However, many questions were raised during the discussion, including the Air Force issue,
before the meeting concluded. Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang sent an urgent telegram to Mao
Zedong: "How many fighters and bombers can the military commission spend to cover when our
army goes abroad to fight? Who can be dispatched from time to time, and who is in charge of the
command?"107 The telegram sent after the meeting also mentioned: "Land and air
communications have not been stipulated. It is said that it must be prescribed by the Military
Commission. Many leaders at the headquarters believe that sending troops without the
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cooperation of the Air Force will do more harm than good.”108 Therefore, it is suggested that
"new equipment can be guaranteed within three or two months (especially the Air Force can be
deployed). Otherwise, it can be carried out as originally planned. Otherwise, the idea of delaying
the dispatch is well worth considering. "109 This is enough to show that the Chinese army had
been promised aid by the Air Force before it was dispatched, but it was not clear how and when.
Now that Zhou Enlai did not get any definite guarantee from Stalin, he naturally agreed to give
up North Korea's opinion.
Stalin said that the Soviet Air Force's lack of readiness was obviously an excuse, because, as
mentioned above, not only the Belov Aviation Division assembled in the Shenyang area was
already on standby, but also a few days prior, Vasilevsky also sent a request to Stalin. It is
reported that the 304th Regiment of the 32nd Fighter Aviation Division and the two anti-aircraft
artillery battalions and other auxiliary forces, which are to be transferred from the Primorsky
Krai to Pyongyang, could an be in place within 5 to 6 days, and on October 3,"Started the
mission to defend Pyongyang."110 The real reason why Stalin clearly stated that the Soviet Air
Force could not be dispatched at the same time as the Chinese Army move in may have been
threefold:
First, Stalin had always forbidden direct conflict between the Soviet army and the U.S. forces
on the front, although air cover might be provided in the rear. On October 2, MacArthur's forces
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crossed the 38th parallel.111 That meant that, North Korea was about to become a theater of war.
Stalin became more cautious as a result, and was reluctant to show any signs that the Soviet
Union would confront the United States directly and openly. If Soviet planes appeared over
North Korea at this time, American intelligence would no doubt break their code/communication
lines them.112
Second, Stalin was skeptical of China's determination to send troops to fight and the prospect
of victory. After the United States entered the war, Stalin hoped that China would be ready to
send troops, and expressed his willingness to use the Air Force to assist, but he was not in a hurry
to ask China to send troops. After the North-Korean positions were overwhelmed, Stalin strongly
encouraged China to send troops in order to stabilize the front, but when the U.S. military had
crossed the 38th parallel and continued to advance northward, and when China, believed that
troops should not be sent at this time, Stalin's trust in China was seriously hurt.113 As Mao
Zedong later said: "At that time, because China hesitated, Stalin was discouraged and said:
Forget it!"114 Stalin stated that the launch of the Soviet Air Force two months later was to see if
the leading Chinese army could stand still in North Korea, thus leaving Moscow a room for
maneuver in time and space.
Thirdly, Stalin also hoped that the issue could be resolved peacefully through secret
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diplomatic channels. When the North Korean army was losing ground under the attack of the UN
forces, Soviet Foreign Minister A.I. Vyshinskii in New York on September 27 telegrammed the
pro-Soviet American entrepreneur Lancaster to the Soviet representative to the United Nations
that he could arrange with the Secretary of State or the ambassador to the United Nations to meet
to discuss a peaceful solution to the North Korean issue. The Soviet Politburo convened a
meeting and resolved the same day to contact the United States, and listen to its
opinions.115Obviously, If the Soviet Union's diplomatic efforts succeeded, even if China did not
send troops to North Korea, Stalin could get an acceptable result without risking war with U.S..
After receiving the call from the Black Sea, Mao Zedong began to waver. Mao had just seen
a telegram from Stalin and Zhou Enlai at 3:30 pm on October 12th. His first reaction had been
was: "I agree with your decision."

116

At 10:22 pm, Mao Zedong again informed them that the

Chinese army had not yet set off and had ordered "the execution of the plan to enter North
Korea" be stopped.117 Stalin then sent a telegram to notify Kim Il Sung of the results of the
Black Sea talks and asked him to organize an immediate retreat.118 In fact, Mao Zedong's
attitude was not as resolute as he said in his telegram. The instructions he gave to Peng Dehuai
and others were: "October 9 order will not be implemented", the troops "will not be dispatched
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temporarily," and Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang would need to come to Beijing to talk.119 The
reason why Mao Zedong did not tell Stalin all his true thoughts is that he might may not have
been sure whether the idea of continuing to send troops under such conditions could be accepted
again by the Chinese leaders. However, after the Politburo’s expanded meeting on the 13th, Mao
Zedong showed China's determination to Stalin.
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CHINESE VOLUNTEERS AND SOVIET AIR FORCE ENTERED
THE WAR
When the meeting had just ended, at 21 o'clock on October 13th, Mao Zedong summoned
Roshchin and announced that after discussion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China decided, "We should help the Koreans."120 Earlier, Kim Il Sung had received Stalin's
notice on the retreat. Although he was surprised, he had to show compliance.121 As a result,
Stalin sent an urgent telegram to Kim Il Sung: "In view of the new decision made by Chinese
comrades, please delay the time for the evacuation of North Korea and the withdrawal of North
Korean troops in the telegram mentioned yesterday. "122 After receiving Roshchin's
supplementary report on China’s troop dispatch in the early morning of the 14th, Stalin again
told Kim Il Sung: "The recommendations you were previously notified about the talks between
the leaders of China and the Soviet Union should be withdrawn."123 The report specifically
pointed out Air Force issues. Mao Zedong said, "Our comrades were unable to make up their
minds because they were unclear about the international situation, the Soviet military assistance,
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and air cover. All these issues are now clear."124 "The main problem is we need to be able to
cover our air force. We hope that the air force can arrive as soon as possible, no later than two
months in any case."
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Mao Zedong also mentioned that he hoped to get weapons and

equipment from the Soviet Union on loan. Zhou Enlai must re-discuss these issues with Stalin.126
In a telegram to Zhou Enlai at 22 o'clock on the 13th, Mao Zedong made clear the
arrangements and requirements for China's decision to send troops. First, after the Chinese army
entered the DPRK, it "can specialize in hitting the Puppet South Korean troops" and establish
bases to boost morale.127 After the Soviet voluntary air force and weapons and equipment arrive,
strike the US military. Second, strive to obtain weapons and equipment provided by the Soviet
Union on a lease basis. Third, we must ask the Soviet Union to send a voluntary air force to help
us in North Korea within two or two and a half months. Fight and cover Beijing, Tianjin,
Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, Qingdao, and other places.128 At 3 o'clock on the 14th, Mao
Zedong once again urged Zhou Enlai: The main question is whether the Soviet Union can
actually send a front-line volunteer air force and cover the air force in major cities in the next
two months; whether additional weapons and equipment can be leased from them.129 At 21:00
on the 14th, Mao Zedong telegraphed to Zhou Enlai and decided to send a total of 260,000
soldiers to Korea on October 19, including 12 infantry divisions and three artillery divisions, and
124

（
125
126
127
128
129

Ibid. “№00326 Roshchin to Stalin: Mao Zedong decides to send troops and demands on the Soviet Union (October 13, 1950)”
№00326 罗申致斯大林电：毛泽东决定出兵及对苏联的要求(1950 年 10 月 13 日)） 89-91.
Ibid.
Ibid.
“A set of telegram” 6-7.
Ibid.
Ibid.7-8
45

asked him to immediately notify Stalin.130 In view of Pyongyang's embattled situation urgency,
in the early morning of October 15, Mao Zedong decided to dispatch the volunteer army in
advance. That is, one army would be dispatched on the 17th and 18th, and the entire army would
cross the river in about ten days.131 Mao Zedong's final determination had been made, and he
had repeatedly pointed out that the core issue remaining was still the dispatch of the Soviet Air
Force. The Chinese position and requirements forced Stalin to make a clear statement.
At this time, Zhou Enlai had returned to Moscow, and wrote a letter to Stalin on the 14th,
conveying Mao Zedong's opinions, and also specifically mentioned the issue of the command
relationship between the "Soviet Volunteer Air Force" and the Chinese Volunteers during the
battle.132 V. M. Molotov, as the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet
Union, probably did not understand Stalin's actual intentions, and, in general, agreed that the
Soviet Union could first send 16 fighter jets to cover the Chinese army. When Zhou Enlai further
proposed "Can bombers continue to be deployed to North Korea to cooperate with Chinese
military operations," in addition to participating in North Korean operations, "Can the Soviet Air
Force be stationed in major cities off the coast of China" and the "How should the command
relationship between the Soviet Air Force and the Chinese Volunteers be resolved"133 In other
issues, Stalin made it clear that even if the Soviet Air Force was deployed, it could only go to the
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Yalu River, and could not cooperate with the volunteer army when it entered North Korea.134
This was undoubtedly a severe blow for the Chinese leaders. On the 17th, Mao Zedong rushed to
call Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to discuss matters in Beijing and postponed the troop release
date. After discussions at the 18th meeting, China decided to return to North Korea on the
19th.135 Mao Zedong finally said: “Now that the enemy has besieged Pyongyang, it will reach
the Yalu River in a mere few days. No matter how serious our difficulties are, the volunteer army
crossing the river to help the DPRK cannot be changed, nor can the time be delayed, and we still
cross the river as originally planned. Even if we can't beat the United States, he136 will always
owe us a bill. Whenever we want to fight, we can fight again.”137
In fact, Moscow did not sit idly by, and Stalin always had two strings to his bow. Just as
China was determined to fight alone, the Soviet Air Force was nervously reorganizing and
gathering. According to the order of the Ministry of Military Affairs, since October 14, the Soviet
Air Force has successfully formed the 144th, 17th, 328th, and 20th Fighter Aviation Divisions in
preparation for traveling to China.138 On October 19, the day of China 's troop dispatch into
Korea, Vasilevsky reported on the preparation and specific time of the Air Force and Tankers to
be sent to China: before November 3, the 151th Fighter Aviation Division already deployed in
the Northeast was to be expanded to Two divisions; before November 28th, the newly formed
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four destroyer aviation divisions had assembled in Shenyang and entered combat readiness
before December 15th; before November 30th, ten tank regiments mobilized from various
military regions arrived in Shenyang; 12 Before January 1, the three newly formed attacker
regiment completed their assembly in Shenyang.139 On October 24, the day before the first battle
of the Volunteers entered the DPRK, the formation of air divisions and tank regiments ended, and
shipments to China began as planned.140
Despite adequate preparations, the Soviet Air Force did not receive operational orders. It was
not until October 25 that the military clashes between the Volunteers and the United Nations
began, and Stalin finally believed that the Communist Party of China was not a nationalist or
"Pro-American" party.141 As a result, on October 29, Soviet advisers informed Zhou Enlai that
Moscow had agreed that the Soviet Air Force would "operate as an air defense in Anton" and
could fly over the border between China and North Korea. It also promised to move the base
from Shenyang to Anton 10 days later.142 On November 1, the Soviet Air Force entered combat
for the first time over the Yalu River. On this day, the Belarus Aviation Division's MiG-15
aircraft took off eight sorties each from Shenyang and Anshan airports, shot down two US F-82
aircraft and hit another two with antiaircraft guns over Anton-Sinuiju. The Soviet side did not
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lose anything in this air battle.143
On November 15, Stalin informed China that the Soviet Union was preparing to send 120
MiG-15 fighters to Belov's division, and thus to establish an army-level command agency (64th
Fighter Aviation Corps). On November 20, the Soviet Council of Ministers resolved to send a
second batch of air forces to China.144 According to this plan, in addition to the 151st Fighter
Division China and the 19th Fighter Division newly established in Anshan, from November to
the beginning of the next year, there were to be 12 fighter divisions, two attacker divisions and
two bomber divisions entering China and is deployed around the northeast and central cities such
as Beijing, Shanghai, Qingdao, and Guangzhou.145
On November 30, the General Staff of the Soviet Army reported that all personnel of the
army command agency had arrived in Shenyang, and the aviation divisions had arrived or were
in the process of relocation. In addition, artillery, ammunition, cars, and other equipment planned
to be supplied to China had also begun to depart, and some had already arrived at their
destinations.146 According to the Air Force General Staff Report, by December 4, the Air Force
sent to China consisted of 11 fighter divisions (17, 20, 28, 50, 65, 144, 151, 297, 309, 324, 328
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divisions), two bomber divisions (162nd and 186th divisions), and some personnel of the 64th
Fighter Aviation Command and the 6th Flight Technical School, totaling five generals, 5,058
officers, and a total of 17,950 troops. At the same time, for the formation of the Chinese Air
Force, 1,653 aircraft have been handed over to China, including 900 fighters (350 MiG-15, 372
MiG-9, 40 La-11, and 130 La-9). There were 117 strike aircraft (IL-10), 132 bombers (Tu-2),
412 trainer aircraft, 44 transport aircraft, and 56 communication aircraft. In addition, 1871
various support vehicles had been delivered.147
After the Chinese Air Force entered the war in the spring of 1951, the "MiG Alley" over the
Yalu River to the Qingchuan River, as it was is often referred to later, had been formed. However,
Stalin's ban on Soviet soldiers from entering the front line was not broken. In the air battle,
Moscow limited the combat range for the 64th Aviation Army, that is, it must not surpass the
Pyongyang-Yuanshan line south, and the east and west sides must not exceed the coastline.
According to Belov, this was "our guiding principles for combat and must be strictly adhered to,"
although this restrictive rule prevented MiG aircraft from fully performing well148 Stalin's
instructions to the Soviet General Counsel in China were clearer: "Absolutely necessary" was
that "the Chinese can only rely on their own air force at the front."149
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THE U.S. EFFORT TO OPPOSE ESCALATION
The United States was not as ignorant of the fact that the Soviet Union entered the war as the
communist countries imagined. they integrated the interception formation of US intelligence
agencies with the observation formation of American pilots who had gone into dogfights.
Americans knew in 1951 that the Soviet Union had secretly entered the war. Fortunately, there
was a tacit understanding between the US and Soviet governments observed to try to control the
scale of the war.Just as North Korea launched the unification war against South Korea in 1950,
Acheson asked George Kennan about the true intentions of the Soviets. The most authoritative
expert on Soviet issues at the time, George Kennan believed that the Soviet Union did not expect
a larger war with the United States. By contrast, what the Soviet Union wanted to see more was
that North Korea and China participated in the war as proxies of the Soviet Union and make the
United States suffer.150 The United States also tried to control the scale of the war. In Truman's
memoirs, it is evident that he tried to prevent MacArthur from expanding the war. After several
crises, he knew very well that the Soviets would not miss even the tiniest chance to gain the
name of an offensive against the West. And this concern indeed became a tacit understanding
between the two sides.151
150
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Truman's first telegram in which he was informed about the operations of the “Chinese” Air
Force was probably the second telegram sent to Truman by MacArthur on November 7, 1950. In
this telegram, MacArthur discovered that Chinese military planes could take off from behind the
Yalu River and implemented a tactic of hit-and-run. This took a toll on the morale and combat
effectiveness of the U.S. military. Truman and Acheson and others discussed this issue several
times in November and to December 1950. According to a summary by the intelligence and
military departments, the Chinese army 's airstrikes undoubtedly caused considerable damage to
US troops, especially aircraft at North Korean airports. Truman still rejected the offer to attack
China, and he did not want to escalate the war.152 Although he did not mention his memoirs that
the Soviets sent the Air Force in secret, it can be concluded that he wanted to avoid head-on
conflicts with China and the Soviet Union.
According to Paul Nietzsche, then Director of Policy Planning, after the United Nations’
forces pushed the north Koreans from Pyongyang (he likely referred to 1950), the US Policy
Planning Staff organized a team to investigate in North Korea. They discovered that many
aircraft of the North Korean Air Force was piloted by Soviet pilots. Policymakers even prepared
a paper later called "Removing the Fig Leaf from the Hard Core of Soviet Responsibility."153 It
detailed the evidence linking the Soviet Union to attacks on South Korea. But the paper was
eventually scrapped because the United States was not ready to advocate any major action to
punish the Soviets, as too many other issues needed to be addressed and no appetite existed for
152
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another global conflict.154 The fact that the Soviet Union secretly participated in the war was
carefully guarded by both sides of the war until the Cold War came to an end in 1988-1989.
Through the continuously open archives and memoirs of both sides, civilians could finally know
the truth.
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CONCLUSION
The Soviet Union began to assist the Chinese Communist Party's air force long before the
Korean War to counter hostile forces led by the Guomindang Air Force. This action set a
precedent for the Soviet Union to formally intervene in the Asian Communist-capitalist clashes,
paving the way for subsequent intervention the Korean War. After the outbreak of the Korean
War, although both China and the Soviet Union thought of sending troops directly to the war,
their fragile relationship caused each to hesitate and wait for the Other. As the United States
entered the war but initially remained passive, North Korean forces advanced quickly. Although
Stalin allowed Kim Il Sung to unify the Korean peninsula, he temporarily cut off some, perhaps
crucial, military aid to Kim Il Sung because he was afraid that the Soviet Union would be
directly confronting the United States in an escalated war. Mao Zedong hoped that he could send
troops to win victory as soon as possible before the United States changed the situation by
landing. During this period, Stalin did not want China to participate in the game, although he
promised to give Chinese volunteers air cover. On the one hand, this was still because of the fear
of escalating the war into the third world war, but, on the other hand, it was hoped that North
Korea could be controlled, and China's participation the war would shake it with no doubt. After
the US landing in Incheon, Mao Zedong hoped to dispatch volunteer troops to assist North Korea
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as soon as possible. But Stalin's worries about direct confrontation with the United States grew,
and he doubted the sincerity and effectiveness of China's troop dispatch. Only when the Chinese
Volunteers directly entered the battle and achieved results, Stalin, who was ready to play both
hands, allowed the Soviet Air Force to enter the battle.
The intervention of the Soviet Union fact brought the fear of escalating the war back to the
White House. US policymakers were forced to choose to refuse to disclose the truth when they
knew that the Soviet Union was already involved. They could only close their eyes to fight the
"Chinese” Air Force. The Chinese Air Force could thus be trained for a longer period of time,
and the ground forces of China and North Korea in the rear could conduct safer operations under
the protection of the Soviet Air Force than before.
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